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Crime and Natural Resource Booms: Evidence from 
Unconventional Natural Gas Production 
 
By TIMOTHY M. KOMAREK * 
The United States has experienced a sudden expansion of natural 
gas production due to the combination of hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling. The energy extraction boom will likely have 
localized impacts, most notably in areas with substantial shale gas 
reserves. This paper exploits a natural experiment in the Marcellus 
region to examine one channel of the so-called ‘resource curse,’ the 
effect of resource extraction on local crime. The results show that 
areas experiencing a natural gas extraction boom suffer a 
significant increase in overall violent crimes, while property crimes 
remain similar to non-boom areas. Furthermore, the violent crime 
increase appears to be driven primarily by increases in aggravated 
and sexual assaults.  






* Komarek: Old Dominion University, 2023 Constant Hall Norfolk, VA 23529 (e-mail: 
tkomarek@odu.edu)  
In the 2000s the United States began experiencing a boom in natural gas 
production. Estimates from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate 
production increased by over 25% from 2000 to 2013. The sudden expansion of 
natural gas was largely due to new technologies combining horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing1 (a.k.a. fracking). Specifically, advances in fracking 
technology have made it profitable to extract natural gas from shale formations2, 
which were previously inaccessible. The EIA 2013 Annual Energy Outlook 
predicts natural gas production will continue to rise with estimates suggesting 
U.S. reserves hold 70 years of natural gas supply. The natural gas boom will 
likely have broad impacts on issues ranging from energy security to climate 
change. However, the energy boom will also impact local communities, or 
‘boomtowns’ where extraction takes place.  
There is a large literature examining the effect of resource extraction and 
specialization on economic growth and the labor market. First, resource extraction 
could create short-run benefits through spillovers in the multiplier process (e.g. 
income and jobs). The income multiplier development channel is likely to be 
relevant for shale gas production due to the potential financial windfall to 
landholders from mineral right leasing (Paredes et al. 2015). While the “resource 
curse” literature highlights that some industries and residents could be harmed 
over time through the extraction industry bidding up factor prices,3 among other 
issues (Corden and Neary 1982, Sachs and Warner 2001, Jacobsen and Parker, 
2014). Nonetheless, the previous literature has found little evidence of the so-
called “resource curse” in the fracking boom (Weber 2014, Brown 2014). 
Media outlets have also begun to draw attention to a darker side of the fracking 
 
1
 See Fitzgerald (2013) for a non-technical description of hydraulic fracturing  
2




 This version of the “resource curse” has been labeled “Dutch disease” 
boom. For example, an article in National Geographic on the Bakken Shale area 
of North Dakota highlights binge drinking, prostitution, and violence among other 
negative behaviors due to the “man camps” that spring up to house outside 
workers (Dobbs 2013). Journalists have also noted increases in drugs and drug 
related crimes in the Washington Post (Horwitz 2014), violence against women in 
the New York Times (Eligon 2013), as well as fatal accidents and sexually 
transmitted infections (Food and Water Watch, 2013). In a revealing exposition 
titled “Wildcatting: A Stripper’s Guide to the Modern American Boomtown” an 
adult entertainment worker describes her “roughneck” customers and the 
transition of Williston, N.D. into a resource extraction boomtown (Shepard 2013). 
The author writes:  
Williston residents complain that an unsavory element has been drawn 
to town, pointing to spikes in violent crime, sexual assault, and drug-
related (often meth) arrests. In March, a man was murdered in the street 
in front of the two strip clubs. A brawl in Heartbreakers spilled into the 
street. It was possibly spurred along by one of the Heartbreakers 
bouncers. A man was shot and killed. The police didn’t arrive for 30 
minutes because the on-duty officers were tied up at another (non-lethal) 
shooting on the other side of town. The phrase “the Wild West” is 
frequently uttered; to many it feels lawless.   
 
The author describes the population growth in the boomtown, which largely 
comes from young males earning a high salary with little attachment to the 
community. This echoes academic research (e.g. Archbold, 2013, Ruddell, 2011) 
suggesting the inability of the local government, including law enforcement, to 
respond to rapidly changing local conditions in boomtowns.  
The resource curse literature, which often examines resource rich countries, 
includes rent seeking, corruption and conflict as channels that perpetuate poor 
overall growth prospects (Van der Ploeg 2011). However, the research on the 
localized effect of a resource boom on criminal activity in a developed country is 
scarce. For example, the criminology literature has utilized qualitative methods to 
show increased fear of crime and drunk driving among local residents as a result 
resource based booms (Carrignton Pereira 2011, Ruddell et al. 2013). While 
Luthra et al. (2007) use pooled time-series analysis for the offshore oil industry in 
Louisiana, but do not significant effects on local crime. In contrast, Haggerty et 
al. (2014) find that specialization in oil and gas extraction in the 1970s negatively 
effected crime rates (property and violent) and education rates long-term. This 
work quantifies the negative effects of the resource bust on crime and quality of 
life indicators.    
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of unconventional4 
(fracking) natural gas extraction, and more generally resource booms, on crime in 
a community. Social costs associated with resource extraction are an important, 
yet less understood component of the resource curse. I use county level data from 
2004 - 2012 on seven FBI Index I offenses and unconventional natural gas wells 
drilled. My identification strategy exploits a natural experiment resulting from 
differing policies related to fracking in the Marcellus region. In particular, the 
State of New York until recently imposed a moratorium on using fracking 
techniques (Rabe and Borick 2013). Conversely, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania permitted use of fracking technology over the sample time period. 
The natural experiment provides an arguably exogenous variation in policy 
regimes, because the New York moratorium was largely due to environmental 
concerns, and not the fear of increased criminal activity.5 My results show that 
natural gas boom counties (measured by 75 or more unconventional wells drilled 
 
4
 "An unconventional gas well is a well that is drilled into an unconventional formation, which is 
defined as a geologic shale formation below the base of the Elk Sandstone or its geologic 
equivalent where natural gas generally cannot be produced except by horizontal or vertical well 
bores stimulated by hydraulic fracturing." (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
SPUD Data Report) 
5
 For example, the fracking opposition group “New Yorkers Against Fracking” focuses on ground 
water contamination issues. More information found at: http://nyagainstfracking.org  
in a year) experience a more than 30% increase in violent crimes compared to 
control counties. In contrast, property crimes in boom counties were statistically 
insignificant in my preferred specification. Falsification tests provide no evidence 
that the positive relationship between fracking and crime is due to divergent pre-
existing trends, and therefore support a causal interpretation. I use data from the 
criminology literature to estimate the total victimization cost of $11.7 million per 
boom county each year.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I measure the 
contemporaneous effect of natural resource extraction on criminal activity. 
Ideally, one would want to examine the effect of the influx of extraction workers 
on crime. However, labor market data is unreliable due to the transient nature of 
many extraction workers and censored industry classification information at the 
county level. Therefore, I consider boom areas based on the number of 
unconventional wells drilled. Inevitably humans commit and are victims of 
crimes, nonetheless unconventional wells drilled act as a proxy for economic 
activity from resource extraction. According to Jacquet (2009), the drilling phase 
is the most labor-intensive part of natural gas extraction. Thus, the time horizon I 
am measuring differs from Haggerty et al. (2014), which considers crime 
resulting from industry specialization and an energy extraction bust. Second, I 
discuss the various theoretical links from the economics and criminology 
literature on resource extraction and crime. Third, I demonstrate that my results 
are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls, such as area and time fixed 
effects, demographics and population change. Furthermore, I show that the results 
are robust to alternative specifications, samples and estimation techniques as well 
as provide an estimate of victimization costs from the criminology literature. 
II. Resource Booms and Crime 
A. Economic Impact of the Natural Gas Boom 
Corden and Neary (1982) and Jacobsen and Parker (2014) highlight the 
broader economic implications of a resource extraction boom and bust. During a 
resource boom an unanticipated labor demand shock is expected to increase 
wages for extraction workers as well as wages in related industries to attract 
workers6. The ability of the local labor market to respond to the demand shock 
depends on the specialized needs in the resource extraction industry and the skills 
of local residents. Research on the coal boom in the 1970s suggests that local 
residents filled many low-skilled jobs (Black et al. 2005a, Black et al. 2005b). On 
the other hand, evidence is limited on the labor market supply response during the 
fracking boom. Several studies show that employment and population increased 
over the course of the fracking energy boom (Weber 2012, Weber 2014, Brown 
2014). However, Ruddel et al. (2014) and White (2012) highlight to the transient 
nature of many extraction workers. The authors refer to them as drive-in and 
drive-out or fly-in and fly-out employees that live in temporary housing or “man 
camps” when working. The unavailability of pertinent migration data and the 
transient nature of many workers make estimating the in-migration response to 
the labor demand shock challenging. 
Economic theory suggests that during the resource extraction boom total wages 
will be bid up. However, in the fracking boom landowners benefit through leasing 
their mineral rights to the extraction companies. The royalty payments received, 
often by local residents, can be lump sum, persist over the course of the 
 
6 Wages being bid up in the non-extraction traded sector over time can result in contraction in the 
traded sectors (manufacturing, construction, etc.).  
 
production period, among other possibilities (Weidner et al., 2009). Thus, there is 
an income shock to a community due to extraction that is separate from the labor 
market shock.  
B. Theoretical Connections Between Resource Booms and Crime 
The economic theory of crime is largely attributed to the work of Gary Becker 
(1968). Becker’s rational choice theory posits that economic agents weigh costs 
and benefits in deciding whether to engage in criminal activity or not. For 
example, this literature highlights benefits from criminal activity in areas with 
income shocks and high economic inequality. Alternatively, the costs to 
committing a crime would include the probability of apprehension and 
imprisonment and the opportunity cost legitimate employment, among other 
costs. Deller and Deller (2010) include Becker’s rational choice model along with 
theories from criminology and sociology to examine crime in rural communities. 
Following Grinols and Mustard (2006) I draw upon relevant theories to examine 
several of the competing theoretical predictions of a resource boom on local 
crime. 
Reductions in crime 
Wage and income effect: Economic theory predicts an increase in wages for 
low-skilled extraction workers and other related industries. Furthermore, if the 
local labor supply is not perfectly elastic non-traded local wages would also be 
expected to rise. The natural gas fracking boom also creates an increase in local 
incomes due royalty payments to landholders. Thus, the higher wages and 
incomes increase the opportunity cost of apprehension, which economic theory 
predicts to lower crime rates. Gould et al. (2002) find that increased wages and 
employment for low-skilled workers reduced crime.  
Development effect: Increased fracking activity can encourage local economic 
development in related industries. For example, Allcott and Keniston (2014) find 
that manufacturing can actually grow in resource boom communities as firms 
supply inputs to the extraction sector. The development channel also suggests 
reduced crime from beneficial labor market spillovers to the non-traded sector.  
Increases in crime 
Development effect: The fracking related economic development channel 
could also increase criminal activity. First, disamenities associated with fracking, 
such as pollution and heavy truck traffic, may discourage new firms and residents 
from locating in a community. Second, some service industries such bars, 
prostitution, drugs, etc. may be drawn to boomtowns. These industries service 
extraction workers, and can become congregation points for criminal activity.   
Increased payoff to crime: Rational choice theory suggests that as wages and 
income in a community increase so does the benefits to committing a crime. The 
increased payoff to crime would be exacerbated if gains from the fracking boom 
were unequally distributed. For instance, extraction workers and large landowners 
may disproportionately benefit from the fracking boom compared to low-skilled 
residents. Economic literature has suggested that having lower-income people 
near high-income people provides a rational incentive to commit crime (Deller 
and Deller 2010). Furthermore, anomie or strain theory notes that inequality can 
create an envy effect and impact violent crimes (Kelly 2000).   
Probability of apprehension: The increase in population and economic 
activity can put a strain on the local infrastructure. Kowalski and Zajac (2012) 
note that phone calls to police increased by over 33% in Pennsylvania energy 
producing counties between 2006 and 2010. With law enforcement stretched thin 
and local governments unable to quickly adjust to the rapidly changing 
environment it is likely that the threat of arrest and prosecution has declined 
in boomtowns.  
Fracking induced population changes: The population growth from resource 
booms comes primarily from young, male extraction workers and support 
industries (Ruddell et al. 2014). These demographic changes create an imbalance 
in the population sex-ratio, and encourage specific types of crimes, in this case 
potentially crimes against women. While population growth alone can fuel crime, 
an influx of young males can further perpetuate the problem.  In particular, young 
males participate in a disproportionate amount of violent and property crimes. 
Furthermore, Deller and Deller (2010) note that when the newcomers enter a 
community social capital deteriorates and crime tends to increase.  
The theories described above suggest that there are competing effects that 
could result in an increase or decrease in overall crime rates. However, it is also 
possible that these mechanisms could cause different impacts across types of 
crimes. In particular, one would expect that the income and beneficial 
development effects would primarily affect property crimes. Thus, for property 
crimes to increase the increased payoff to crimes would have to out weigh the 
opportunity cost of getting caught. This could be the case if the benefits from the 
fracking boom are disproportionately concentrated among extraction workers and 
landowners, while local residents do not benefit or are economically worse off. 
This scenario seems unlikely, especially during the boom phase. Thus, I expect 
property crimes to not differ between boom and non-boom counties.  
The wage and income as well as development effects would also be expected to 
influence violent crimes. In the same channel as property crimes, being 
apprehended for committing a violent crime would affect ones earning potential, 
likely decreasing violent crimes. Conversely, extraction workers often earn high 
wages in remote areas. The development effect from industries servicing workers 
may perpetuate violent crimes. For example, bars and strip clubs may serve as 
gathering places, leading to alcohol-induced crimes. While the sex ratio 
imbalance may lead to a higher incident of conflicts with local residents and 
increase sexual assaults. Consequently, I expect an increase in aggravated and 
sexual assaults in boomtowns. 
III. Data and Sample Description 
To examine the effect of activities related to the natural gas boom on local crime I 
use county level data from New York and Pennsylvania. Data on crime are from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report for seven FBI 
Index I offenses7. The offenses include violent crime (aggravated assault, rape, 
robbery, and murder) as well as property crimes (larceny, burglary, and auto 
theft). I obtained data on the number of unconventional natural gas wells drilled 
by county from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. I use 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s demographic data on gender, race and age groups to 
calculate their share in each county and the population density. The employment 
and unemployment data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics data. Finally, I use county-level income data from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal Income (BEA LAPI) 
database. The BEA revised their income statistics to include royalty income from 
mineral extraction8, among other sources of income. Thus, the income data 
provide a more accurate portrayal of the income shock in a community from 
fracking than wages or salary data. 
 
7 For more information see: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr 
8 For more information on the BEA’s Local Area Personal Income revision and methodology 
see:www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/12%20December/1213_lapi-text.pdfand 
www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2011.pdf 
A. Sample Selection 
The initial sample includes counties in Pennsylvania and New York from 2004 
through 2012. The states were chosen because they both share the Marcellus shale 
region, yet differ in natural gas extraction policy. New York implemented a 
moratorium on fracking, while the Pennsylvania allowed early adoption of 
fracking technology (Rabe and Borick 2013). Figure 1 shows the Utica and 
Marcellus shale formations shared by the two states. The differing policies in the 
region provide a natural experiment to analyze the effect to natural gas production 
on crime.  
The policies in New York and Pennsylvania have led to dramatically different 
levels of natural gas production. Figure 2 displays the natural gas production in 
both states from 2004 to 2012. Prior to 2007, natural gas production growth in 
each state was relatively stagnant. Pennsylvania produced an average of 179 
million mcf 9 and New York averaged 52 million mcf. However, by 2012 the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s natural gas production increased to 1,298 
million mcf, a 625% increase. In contrast, New York’s natural gas production 
remained flat over the sample time frame. The increased production is largely 
attributed to the adoption of fracking technology used in the Marcellus Shale. 
Furthermore, the production of natural gas closely matches unconventional 
natural gas wells, which produce natural gas from shale formations, drilled in 
Pennsylvania. Thus, the sample is restricted to only include counties that have 
some coverage in the Marcellus shale region shown in Figure 1. This provides an 




 mcf stands for 1,000s of cubic feet. 
B. Unconventional Well Data and Determining Boom Counties 
I obtained county level data on unconventional natural gas wells from the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. The well data comprises 
bore holes drilled in unconventional shale formation, which typically t produce 
natural gas using hydraulic fracturing techniques. I focus on the number of wells 
being drilled, rather than production amounts for several reasons. First, natural 
gas production data can be highly variable from year to year due to measurement 
and reporting challenges. Thus, the most convincing studies using production data 
look at longer-run effects, for example over a decade (Weber 2014, Brown 2014).  
Second, economic activity associated with drilling, such as increases in labor, are 
often associated with boomtowns. Jaquette (2009) suggests that the majority of 
the extraction related jobs come from well development and construction, while 
relatively few workers are involved in production and reclamation. Third, natural 
gas production often continues years, or even decades, after the well is initially 
drilled. Thus, production data can be a misleading measure of economic activity 
related to the fracking boom. 
I use the number of unconventional wells to determine the counties that 
experience an unanticipated labor demand shock from fracking. Figure 3 displays 
the distribution of new unconventional wells drilled conditional on a county 
having at least one well over the sample period. Over 80% of county-years have 
under 75 new unconventional wells drilled. This comes both from counties with 
few total wells, as well as the initial ‘test’ drilling period for boom counties. I 
define a boom county as a county with over 75 new unconventional wells in a 
year. This allows for both temporal and geographic variation in the fracking 
boom. Boom counties are grouped together in the southwest corner of 
Pennsylvania and in northern the northern portion of the Commonwealth near the 
New York border.  
Using a boom county indicator, rather than the number of wells drilled, is a 
subjective measure of fracking activity. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the 
literature on local impacts of resource booms (Black et al. 2005, Weber 2012, 
Jacobsen and Parker 2014). I also show in section 5.2 that the general results are 
robust to different measures of the boom county along with using the number of 
unconventional wells as a continuous variable.  
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for boom and non-boom counties in the 
Marcellus region from 2004 through 2012. The boom county sample includes 63 
county-years while the non-boom region comprises 873 county-years. The p-
value in Table 1 tests for difference in the means of boom and non-boom 
counties, where the null hypothesis is that they are not different. Boom counties 
had on average 64.7 unconventional wells compared to 1.6 for non-boom 
counties. The boom and non-boom counties had similar demographic profiles 
during the sample period. Boom and non-boom counties had age, population 
density, unemployment, employment, population and income difference in means 
that were not statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The employment 
change in boom counties was statistically different than non-boom counties at the 
1% level, while population growth was statistically insignificant. This is 
consistent with local job creation associated with fracking, but disamenities from 
drilling reducing population growth relative to non-boom counties. 
IV. Empirical Methods and Estimation 
My empirical strategy uses annual panel data from 2004-2012 to estimate the 
effect of unconventional natural gas wells on crime. The empirical model uses 
variation in both the timing of fracking in a county and the moratorium on 
fracking natural gas in the State of New York over the sample time frame. Thus, I 
exploit the natural experiment in the Marcellus shale region. Counties in 
Pennsylvania can receive the “treatment” of hight fracking activity, while similar 
counties in New York can only be “controls” due to the policy. The base model 
specification uses all counties in the Marcellus shale region. I experiment later 
with alternative samples, specifications and estimation techniques and the results 
prove robust. The basic analysis begins with the following regression model: 
 
(1)      𝑌!" = 𝛽!𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝑋!"Θ+ 𝛼! + 𝛾! + 𝜀!"  
 
where Yct is a measure crime in county c at time t. Crime is the inverse hyperbolic 
sine transformed number of reported crimes per 100,000 residents. The inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation10 allows for the same interpretation as a log 
transformation11 (Burbidge, et al. 1988). However, it is defined at zero, and thus, 
does not drop county-years with zero crimes. The variable HighFrackingct is a 
indicator variable equal to 1 if county c year t had over 75 unconventional natural 
gas wells and 0 otherwise. Similarly, LowFrackingct is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if county c year t has between 1 and 75 unconventional wells and 0 
otherwise. The estimated parameters β1 and β2 can then be interpreted as the 
percent change in crime attributable to high and low fracking activity in a county 
respectively.  
The vector 𝑋!" contains a wide range of demographic and labor market control 
variables listed in Table 1. By using panel data I am able to control for several 
types of unobserved heterogeneity. 𝛼! is a county fixed effect that controls for 
observable and unobservable differences across counties that are constant over 
time. The time fixed effect 𝛾! controls for common shocks that affect in all 
 
10
 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is expressed as ln  (𝑟 + 𝑟! + 1), where r is the 
variable to be transformed. 
11
 The results are robust to using the log transformation and adding 1 to each observation i.e. 
log(Yct + 1).  
counties over time. Furthermore, the inclusion of county and time fixed effects is 
crucial to proper identification given my research design. Finally, 𝜀!" is a random 
disturbance term. To estimate the model in equation 1, I use unweighted ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions.  To correct for serial correlation I cluster the 
standard errors by county following Arellano (1987).  
The criminology literature has suggested that crime rates are closely tied to 
local labor market conditions (Gould et al. 2002, Levitt, 2001). Therefore, I 
include pertinent labor market variables like the unemployment rate, income per 
capita along with the employment level and employment growth. Previous studies 
on the effect of casinos on crime (Grinols and Mustard 2006) and drunk driving 
(Cotti and Walker 2010) have also highlighted the importance of controlling for 
population-induced effects. Thus, I add controls for various demographic groups, 
the level of population and population growth from the U.S. Census. 
Unfortunately, a weakness in the Census data is its inability to capture the 
transient nature of the natural gas and oil labor market. 
V. Results 
A. Basic Results 
I begin examining the effect of fracking activity on crime by estimating equation 
1. I use a balanced sample, containing high fracking, low fracking and control 
counties within the Marcellus Shale region for New York and Pennsylvania. 
Table 2 shows estimates for all violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and 
aggravated assault) as well as all property crimes (burglary, larceny, and auto 
theft). The results in Table 3 decompose crimes into each of the seven FBI Index I 
offenses. In each case the dependent variable is the hyperbolic sine transformation 
of crime rates for 100,000 residents. Thus, the estimates can be interpreted as 
elasticities. The second and fourth columns in Table 2 include the control 
variables listed in Table 1. Finally, the estimates in both Table 2 and Table 3 
include county and year fixed effects as well as control variables. F-statistics for 
the joint significance of the year and county fixed effects are statistically 
significant in all models.  
The results in Table 2 show a positive effect of fracking activity on violent 
crime. For example, the first column in Table 2 suggests that a high fracking 
county experiences an increase in violent crimes of approximately 35%, 
compared to counties without any fracking. Similarly, low fracking counties also 
experience a positive and statistically significant increase in violent crime of 11%. 
This relationship also holds when I include a several pertinent control variables 
common in the crime literature (Levitt 2001, Gould et al. 2002). The results also 
show that the effect of fracking is smaller for property crimes. Without including 
control variable (column 3), the effect of fracking is a less than 10% increase on 
property crimes for high intensity areas. While the effect on property crimes is 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level when including control variables.  
The results in Table 3 examine each of the FBI Index I offenses individually. 
Panel A shows violent crimes, while Panel B examines property crimes. In 
general, Table 3 suggests that the violent crime increase (shown in Table 2) is 
primarily driven by increases in rape and aggravated assault. Both rapes and 
aggravated assaults increase by over 30% in high fracking activity counties. 
Furthermore, murder and robbery are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. 
The r-squared suggests that the model examining variation in murders is under 
0.4, while the model for aggravated assault is 0.77. Thus, even including fixed 
effects and control variables the model explains less than 40% of the variation in 
murders. Finally, the high fracking variable is statistically insignificant for all 
three types of property crimes at the 10% level.  
B. Falsification Tests 
The natural experiment provides an arguably exogenous variation in policy 
regimes between fracking counties in Pennsylvania and non-fracking counties in 
New York. Furthermore, the difference-in-differences strategy, shown in equation 
1, also hinges on the pre-existing trends between fracking and non-fracking areas 
not differing. If for example, fracking boom counties were experiencing faster 
growth in criminal activity relative to non-fracking counties in the Marcellus 
region, this could lead to estimating a positive spurious relationship. 
I examine whether the positive association between the fracking boom and 
crime discussed in section 5.1 is due to differential pre-exisiting trends by 
estimating falsification tests. I do this by estimating equation (1) with the fracking 
boom indicator variables shifted 3 or 4 years ahead of the actual boom. Thus, 
conditioning on time and county fixed effects, contemporaneous fracking 
indicators should predict a crime and fracking relationship, if there is one, while 
leads prior to the boom should not. Table 4 shows the results of the falsification 
tests. Each model includes all of the control variables as well as county and time 
fixed effects. The high and low fracking indicator variables are not statistically 
significant at the 10% level for property and violent crimes. Thus, the falsification 
tests do not provide evidence of a spurious, positive result due to pre-exisiting 
trends. 
C. Robustness Checks 
While I believe that my identification strategy, functional form choices, etc. are 
reasonable, nonetheless, I recognize that thoughtful researchers could choose 
alternative approaches. Thus, I show several alternative estimates in Table 5 to 
show that my results are robust to alternative strategies. I focus on evaluating total 
violent and property crimes. Each set of results use county and year fixed effects 
and the full range of control variables. The comparable basic results can be found 
in Table 2. The basic results suggest a 30% increase in violent crimes and no 
statistically significant effect in property crimes.  
The first set of robustness checks considers alternative specifications for both 
the dependent and independent variable of interest. Model 1 displays estimate 
where the dependent variable is the level of crime, instead of the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation of the crime rate. Using the level of crime rate 
suggests that high fracking activity increases violent crimes by 61 per 100,000 
residents. While similar to the basic model, high fracking activity has a 
statistically insignificant effect on property crime rates. Next, I interact the high 
fracking and low fracking activity dummy variables with the demeaned county 
population. This strategy was used by Cotti and Walker (2010) to test for 
population induced impacts on drunk driving from casino openings. The 
coefficient can be interpreted as the percent increase in crime rate from high (or 
low) fracking activity in a county with average population, relative to the control 
group of counties without any fracking taking place. The results on the high and 
low fracking variables in model 2 are similar to the basic model results. Further, 
the interaction terms show a statistically insignificant population induced effect 
from fracking activity. Finally, models 3 – 5 use alternative indicators of the 
fracking boom. Model 3 uses the number of unconventional wells similar to the 
specification employed by Paredes et al. (2015). It suggests that every additional 
unconventional well is associated with a 0.1% increase in violent crimes. The 
other boom county indicators in models 4 and 5 show an approximately 22% 
increase in violent crimes from fracking. 
Next, I examine an alternative sample of counties. Paredes et al. (2015) argues 
that parts of New York still experience economic activity associated with fracking 
despite its moratorium on the practice. For example, a major railroad line travels 
along the Pennsylvania and New York border and several extraction companies 
have located regional headquarters on the New York side of the border. In the 
treatment and control paradigm, this would suggest that counties in Upstate New 
York should also be considered treated counties. I would expect this to downward 
bias my results reported in Table 2. Model 6 shows results eliminating the New 
York border counties. The high fracking indicator variable remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level and high fracking activity is associated with a 33% 
increase in violent crimes.  
The final set of robustness checks examines alternative estimation techniques. 
The basic results from section 5.1 use unweighted OLS regressions with standard 
errors cluster by county. It could be argued that since crime rates are highly 
variable, and individual crimes are aggregated to the county that it could be 
appropriate to use weighted least squares. However, Solon et al. (2013) suggest 
using caution and relying on diagnostics when using weighted estimation to 
correct for heteoskedasticity or identify average partial effects in the presence of 
unmodeled heterogeneity. Model 7 displays results for weighting equation 1 by 
county-year population. The estimated coefficients imply that high fracking 
activity causes a 20% increase in violent crimes compared to the control group, 
while low fracking increases violent crimes by 5%. The estimates weighting by 
county-year population are smaller than the unweighted results, yet still 
statistically significant for violent crimes. The fixed effects Poisson estimation 
technique is another potential estimation strategy that accounts for the count-
nature of the crime data. The fixed effects Poisson estimation in Model 8 yields 
similar results as the base models. 
VI. Estimates of Victimization Costs of Fracking 
Policy makers and natural gas proponents often cite the benefits in terms of jobs 
and income that are created in a community. However, the welfare costs of 
victims of crimes, among other costs, should also be considered to make optimal 
policy decisions. The results presented in section 5 suggest that the fracking boom 
in the Marcellus region attributed to an increase in violent crimes, while property 
crimes remained unchanged. I use published estimates of the victimization costs 
for FBI Index I crimes to infer an aggregate community level crime cost to 
fracking activity. 
Table 6 presents victimization costs from McCollister et al. (2010). The costs 
for each criminal category include measures of tangible costs (e.g. medical 
expenses, property damage, etc.) and intangible costs (e.g. elevated fear, pain and 
suffering, etc.). McCollister et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive methodology 
to estimating the cost of crimes to society and use the most current available data 
different crimes in 2008 dollars. The estimated victimization costs range from 
almost $9 million for murder to just over $3,500 for larceny.  
My estimates suggest that violent crimes increased in a county by 
approximately 35% from fracking, while property crimes were statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level. On average, the violent crime increase in boom 
counties was 61 per 100,000 residents. The violent crime increase is primarily 
attributed to increases in aggravated assaults (40 per 100,000 residents) and 
sexual assaults (20 per 100,000 residents). I focus on these two crime metrics 
because of their statistical significance in the results, and to provide a lower 
bound for the aggregate county level victimization. The summary statistics in 
table show that the average population in boom counties was approximately 
100,000 residents over the sample timeframe. Thus, the estimates can be thought 
of the amount of additional crimes in the average county per year. Using the 
estimated victimization costs in table 6 suggests that the county cost of aggravated 
assaults is approximates $4.8 million and sexual assaults is $4.2 million per 
year12. 
VII. Conclusion 
In the 2000s the U.S. experienced a boom in natural gas production from the 
advent of fracking technology. The localized effects of extraction have been 
concentrated in areas with shale plays. I examine one negative consequence of 
resource extraction in the Marcellus shale region, increased crime. To estimate the 
effect of the fracking boom on crime I exploit a natural experiment in policy 
regimes between Pennsylvania and New York and use panel data estimation 
techniques. The results show that areas experiencing a natural gas extraction 
boom suffer increase in overall violent crimes, while property crimes remain 
similar to non-boom areas. I examine FBI Index I offenses and show that the 
increase in violent crimes appears to be driven by increases in aggravated assaults 
and rapes. Victimization costs from the criminology literature suggest that 
fracking is associated with a cost of $9 million per boom county each year. 
I show that the results are robust to a wide array of control variables that 
include demographic categories, population density, and labor market variables. 
In particular, I include population growth and employment growth variables to 
control for changes in the size of the population, which has been linked to crime 
rates in previous studies. I also show that the results are robust to alternative 
specifications of the dependent variable and explanatory variable of interest, an 
indicator for a county experiencing a resource extraction shock. Furthermore, I 
show my estimates are robust to alternative samples (eliminating New York 
border counties) and estimation methods, such as weighting techniques and fixed 
 
12
 E.g. 40 additional aggravated assaults per year * $240,776 victimization costs  = $9,631,040 
per boom county per year. 
effects Poisson model. Nonetheless, one should take caution in extrapolating these 
results to other parts of the country experiencing the energy boom.  
I provide several theoretical explanations from economics, crime and sociology 
for changes in local crime rates. Unfortunately, pertinent data on short-term labor 
migration of extraction workers is either unreliable or not available. One 
interpretation of the results suggests that the influx of temporary extraction 
workers creates a magnate for criminality. Thus, regions can experience a 
negative consequence of the so-called ‘resource curse’ during the natural resource 
boom. The results eliminating New York border counties suggest that crime is not 
just being relocated within the region. The results suggest that policy makers 
should include increased crime as a potential cost to unconventional natural gas 
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Figure 1: Shale Formations in the Northeastern United States 
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           Figure 2: Natural Gas Production By State 
 
                           Source: Author’s calculation from ERS County-level Oil and Gas 
     Production in the U.S. 
 
            Figure 3: Distribution of Unconventional Natural Gas Wells 
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  Boom Counties Non-Boom Counties 	  	  	  
	    Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.      P-value 
      Dependent Variables        
Violent Crime Rate 146.1 50.1 
 
216.5 110.5 0.000 
 Property Crime Rate 1,566.6 399.5 
 
1,914.4 575.0 0.000 
 Auto Theft Rate 81.2 32.6 
 
81.6 59.6 0.959 
 Larceny Rate 1,112.40 340.2 
 
1,395.8 457.4 0.000 
 Burglary Rate 372.9 100.9 
 
437 171.6 0.004 
 Aggravated Assault Rate 91.0 38.7 
 
145 75.7 0.000 
 Robbery Rate 27.5 20.8 
 
42.2 48.1 0.017 
 Rape Rate 25.4 13.3 
 
27.2 30.6 0.660 
 Murder Rate 2.1 2.2 
 
2.2 2.4 0.629 
      Control Variables       
Unconventional Wells 64.7 82.8 
 
1.4 6.2 0.000 
 % Male 0.495 0.010 
 
0.497 0.021 0.415 
 % White 0.963 0.018 
 
0.93 0.053 0.000 
 % Black 0.02 0.016 
 
0.042 0.04 0.000 
 % Age 0-9 0.111 0.006 
 
0.112 0.013 0.779 
 % Age 10-19 0.135 0.007 
 
0.139 0.013 0.029 
 % Age 20-29 0.114 0.014 
 
0.123 0.028 0.021 
 % Age 30-39 0.114 0.01 
 
0.116 0.011 0.274 
 % Age 40-49 0.149 0.01 
 
0.148 0.012 0.602 
 Population Density 110.6 81.0 
 
222.0 283.0 0.002 
 Unemployment Rate 0.167 0.192 
 
0.167 0.183 0.995 
 Income per capita 
($1,000s) 27.0 4.3 
 
27.4 4.2 0.510 
 Employment 47,949.8 32,774.5 
 
72,485.7 96,261.8 0.044 
 % Change in Employment 0.012 0.025 
 
-0.001 0.022 0.000 
 Population 98,919.5 66,217.4 
 
152,808.3 197,394.9 0.031 
 % Change in Population 0.001 0.005   0.001 0.009 0.649 
 Notes: Crime rates in annual incidents per 100,000 population. Monetary amounts in year 2000    
dollars. Boom county sample size is 63 and non-boom county sample size equals 873. The p- 
value tests for difference in the means of boom and non-boom counties. The null hypothesis is  
that they are not different. 
 
 
 TABLE 2: THE EFFECT OF FRACKING ON VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME (2004-2012) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 





          
High Fracking    0.349***    0.351***  0.0948* 0.0813 
 
(0.0817) (0.0921) (0.0551) (0.0581) 
Low Fracking 0.115** 0.109** -0.0171 -0.0135 
 
(0.0503) (0.0534) (0.0255) (0.0269) 
     
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 936 936 936 936 
R-squared 0.815 0.820 0.847 0.854 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes per    
100,000 residents  
















TABLE 3: THE EFFECT OF FRACKING ON FBI INDEX I OFFENSES (2004-2012)  
Panel A: Violent Crimes Murder Rape Robbery 
Aggravated 
Assault 
     High Fracking -0.0719     0.323** -0.249      0.344*** 
 
(0.282) (0.161) (0.269) (0.128) 
Low Fracking -0.242* -0.0278 -0.142     0.128** 
 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.117)    (0.0644) 
     Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 936 936 936 936 
R-squared 0.396 0.404 0.805 0.775 
     Panel B: Property Crimes Burglary Larceny Auto Theft 
 
     High Fracking 0.0875 0.0809 -0.192 
 
 
(0.0921) (0.0635) (0.194) 
 Low Fracking -0.0296 -0.00776 -0.187* 
 
 
(0.0284) (0.0319) (0.103) 
 
     Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 County FE Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 936 936 936 
 R-squared 0.790 0.869 0.791 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes  









 TABLE 4: FALSIFICATION TESTS OF FRACKING BOOM ON VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME  
Analysis Type Fracking Boom Date Falsification Test 
# of Years Boom Date Shifted 3 years ahead 4 years ahead 3 years ahead 4 years ahead 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





          
High Fracking 0.0623 -0.0492 0.0823 0.00720 
 
(0.106) (0.100) (0.0565) (0.0433) 
Low Fracking -0.0507 -0.0679 0.0290 -0.00420 
 
(0.0503) (0.0751) (0.0246) (0.0150) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 728 624 728 624 
R-squared 0.819 0.844 0.937 0.943 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes per   
100,000 residents  
These results are from the difference-in-difference specification that moves the fracking boom  




















     Alternative Specification    
1. Dependent variable in levels  
   (Crimes per 100,000 population) 
High Fracking    61.04***   109.9 
   (19.67)    (89.55) 
Low Fracking    26.80**   -25.77 
   (13.16)   (41.77) 
    2. Fracking indicators interacted with 
de-meaned population. For example 
High Fracking*Population = High 
Fracking* [Log(population)- 
log(mean population)]  
High Fracking  0.358***  0.0778 
 (0.0896) (0.0622) 
Low Fracking  0.110** -0.0154 
 (0.0523) (0.0277) 
 High Fracking*Population -4.137  3.009 
   (6.362) (6.018) 
 
Low Fracking*Population  -1.485 -2.133 
   (4.465)  (1.515) 
    3. Explanatory variable: # of wells # of wells  0.00133***  0.000373 
 (0.000480) (0.0002) 
    
4. Explanatory variable: fracking  
indicator variable cutoff at 125     
wells 
Wells>125  0.222***  0.0315 
 (0.0789) (0.0658) 
0<Wells<125  0.109** -0.0127 
 (0.0536) (0.0262) 
    
5. Explanatory variable: fracking  
indicator variable cutoff at 25 wells 
Wells>25  0.203**  0.0183 
 (0.0967) (0.0516) 
 0<Wells<25  0.112** -0.0119 
  (0.0530)  (0.0273) 
     Alternative Sample 
   6. Eliminating NY Border Counties High Fracking  0.331***  0.0652 
 (0.0917) (0.0582) 
Low Fracking  0.0990* -0.0213 
 (0.0533) (0.0268) 
     Alternative Estimation Method 
   7. Weighted by county-year 
population 
High Fracking 0.202** 0.0468 
  (0.0847) (0.0560) 
 Low Fracking     0.0544** -0.0251 
    (0.0269) (0.0211) 
TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
8. Fixed Effects Poisson High Fracking      0.364*** 0.063*** 
   (0.0270) (0.0084) 
Low Fracking      0.139*** -0.017*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0037) 
























TABLE 6: PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED VICTIMIZATION COSTS 
   Violent Crimes 
 Rape/Sexual Assault $240,776  
Murder $8,982,907  
Aggravated Assault $107,020  
Robbery $42,310  
   Property Crimes 
 Burglary $6,462  
Larceny $3,532  
Motor Vehicle Theft $10,772  
               McCollister, K.E., M.T. French, and H. Fang. 2010. “The cost of  
                  crime to society: New crime-specific estimates for policy and program  
                  evaluation” Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 108, pg 89-109. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
